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Discussion of  cognitive scaffolding is dominated by attention to ways that external 
structure can support cognitive activity or augment an agent’s cognitive capacities. We call 
instances where the interests of  the user are served benign and argue for the possibility of  
hostile scaffolding. This is scaffolding which depends on the same capacities of  an agent to rely 
on external structure, but that undermines or exploits that agent while serving the interests of  
another. We offer one defence of  hostile scaffolding by developing an account of  a neglected 
complementarity between extended phenotype thinking and extended functionalism. We 
support this with a second defence, an account of  design features of  electronic gambling 
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The claim that cognition can be scaffolded occurs frequently in discussion of  whether minds 
or cognition are extended.1 The general idea is that things in the environment, including other 
agents, can support, simplify or otherwise beneficially transform cognitive processes just as 
physical scaffolding can beneficially transform the demands and risks of  construction and 
maintenance. The idea of  cognitive scaffolding goes back at least to Vygotsky, who 
characterized a ‘zone of  proximal development’ indicating, among other things, a learning 
stage where a task could be performed successfully only with a supportive guide (Vygotsky 
1978).2 In contemporary cognitive science ‘scaffolding’ is used to embrace non-temporary 
cognitive infrastructure, and resources outside explicitly developmental contexts, including 
everyday supports like scheduling tools and conventionally labelled public spaces. Humans are 
distinguished by the extent of  their reliance on scaffolding, and in the great variety of  forms 
of  scaffolding they use (Clark 1997, Sterelny 2012). 
 
We argue here for the theoretical coherence, actual existence, and importance of  hostile 
cognitive scaffolding. (From here on we’ll mostly drop the ‘cognitive’ qualifier.) Most 
discussion of  scaffolding focuses on how it can be supportive or helpful by reducing cognitive 
demands, improving reliability, facilitating co-operation, and making possible tasks that would 
be beyond an unaided individual. We don’t dispute that this benign scaffolding is genuine and 
important. But agents that are capable of  benefitting from benign scaffolding may for that 
reason be vulnerable to external structure that interfaces with their capacities for distributing 
cognitive labour in ways that harm them. When this vulnerability is exploited in ways that 
undermine their own interests and serve those of  other agents, we call the scaffolding hostile. 
We mean hostile in the sense of  Sterelny (2003), whose emphasis on informational hostility is 
an important corrective to optimistic slogans about the world serving as ‘its own best 
representation’ (Brooks 1991). 
 
Our defence of  hostile scaffolding has three parts. One develops an account of  what 
hostile scaffolding is, so that we have something definite to aim for. This involves clarifying 
 
1   The claim that cognition can be extended, including being scaffolded is weaker than and different to the 
claim that minds are extended (Sterelny 2010). Our interest here is in cognitive scaffolding, not the 
boundaries of minds. 
2   The term ‘scaffolding’ (in English) to refer to cognitive developmental support was introduced in Wood, 
Bruner and Ross (1976), and first explicitly linked to Vygotsky in Cazden (1981). 
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what scaffolding is, distinguishing benign from hostile scaffolding, and introducing a 
distinction between shallow and deep scaffolding (section 2). The second develops an account 
of  complementarities between arguments for extended cognition, and the defence of  the idea 
of  extended phenotypes which together predict hostile scaffolding (section 3). The third is a 
case study, arguing that contemporary machine gambling devices and casino management 
systems are real instances of  hostile scaffolding (section 4). Sterelny (2010) has argued, 
without using the label, that hostile scaffolding is unlikely to be a big deal. We respond to his 
reasons for skepticism late in section (4), and conclude in Section (5). 
 
Our claims are not entirely unprecedented. Slaby (e.g. 2016) has argued that affective 
scaffolding in some environments, especially workplaces, can perpetrate a kind of  ‘mind 
invasion’ when it sculpts behaviour and habit in ways that harm the the interests of  
employees. Liao and Huebner (2020) have argued that material artefacts and environments can 
themselves be oppressive, when biased in the same direction as an oppressive system, and bi-
directionally causally embedded it. We differ from Slaby in considering both cognitive and 
affective scaffolding. We also differ from Slaby, and from Liao and Huebner, as we will see, 
because hostility is a narrower and less systemic notion than oppression. We say more about 
how hostile scaffolding relates to mind invasion and oppressive things, and how our proposal 
complements theirs, in section (5). 
2. Scaffolding, benign and hostile 
2.1 Benign Scaffolding 
 
The general idea of  cognitive scaffolding is of  something external — usually to the body, 
but sometimes to the brain — that in some way supports cognitive processes. As Clark put it 
in Being There, “exploitation of  external structure is what I mean by the term scaffolding.” (Clark 
1997, p45). There’s generally little appetite for regimenting scaffolding talk, which is 
recognised to pick out a varied collection of  situated, embodied and distributed cognitive 
phenomena. Given our aim of  making a significant addition to the range of  things recognised 
as scaffolding, we need to be more deliberate. Here is an inclusive and neutral characterisation: 
Cognitive Scaffolding is external structure that changes the cognitive demands of  a task. 
 
To count as external something should be to a significant extent outside the ‘skull or skin’. 
Structure is an inclusive place-holder, embracing objects, mechanisms, temporally organised 
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processes, symbolic systems, public language, and the activity of  other possibly encultured 
agents. We also intend cognitive to be understood inclusively, to embrace affective and 
motivational phenomena as well as more traditionally cognitive ones, and to to include cases 
with a ‘pushmi-pullyu’ character where the cognitive and motivational or affective are 
entangled (Millikan 1995). That said, we will sometimes emphasise whether scaffolding is 
predominantly affective or cognitive. Because the cognitive thus understood is a large and 
varied category, many kinds of  change can be brought about by scaffolding. A jacket left 
hanging on the bathroom door handle scaffolds remembering to dress smartly in the morning. 
A cook organising partly prepared ingredients in a workspace reduces search time by 
simplifying perception, or facilitates the construction of  a pleasing regular arrangement with 
reduced measurement and planning (Kirsch 1995). Hutchins (1995) describes many examples 
of  artefacts which transform the computational demands of  navigation, including the ‘three 
scale nomogram’ (example in Hutchins 1995, p148), which converts several multiplication and 
division operations relating distance time and speed into drawing a straight line that connects 
two known values and which crosses all of  three appropriately positioned logarithmic scales. 
Slide rules on which several rigid logarithmic scales — some mobile in relation to others — 
are marked allow multiplication and division to be performed by manipulating the scales, 
because the physical structure of  the device preserves a large number of  mathematical 
relationships (Hutchins 1995, p170f).  
 
Although the above examples emphasise the traditionally cognitive (memory, perception, 
reasoning), scaffolding can also be affective. Consider how mementos, places, pieces of  
recorded music and forms of  embodied activity can help occasion or sustain desired affective 
or motivational states, and sometimes have downstream cognitive effects (Griffiths & 
Scarantino 2009; Colombetti & Kruger 2015; Piredda 2019; Maiese 2016). Finally, saying that 
scaffolding changes the cognitive demands of  a task doesn’t presume that the task could be 
performed unaided. We emphasise that one consequence of  this characterisation is that 
whether or not something is scaffolding depends on and is restricted to the specified task and 
agent, and isn’t an all or nothing property of  the external structure. This is not a bug, but a 
feature: scaffolding, like the affordances of  ecological psychology, isn’t purely environmental, 
but rather irreducibly relational. The slide rule is only useful to those competent to use it, and 
one person’s motivating exercise playlist might be another’s acoustic purgatory. 
 
The idea of  scaffolding borders on and overlaps with the notions of  epistemic actions, 
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and cognitive niches. Epistemic — as distinct from pragmatic — actions are “physical actions 
that make computation easier, faster, or more reliable” (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, 513-4). A 
common example is manually rotating a jigsaw puzzle piece so that determining whether it fits 
is a relatively easy visual matching task, compared to mental rotation. Some scaffolding is 
produced by epistemic actions (leaving the jacket on the bathroom door, arranging the 
workspace), but this isn’t a general requirement for scaffolding which can be found as well as 
made. A cognitive niche, on the other hand, is a significantly scaffolded environment that may 
benefit many individuals. This version of  the more general idea of  niche construction and 
inheritance emphasises the ways in which the activity of  some living things makes their 
environments more cognitively favourable for themselves and their descendants. Beaver dams, 
for example, increase the length of  the water/land boundary, and so increase the foraging 
space close to the safety of  water (Sterelny 2011, p239). Neither epistemic actions nor 
scaffolding are uniquely human. Sterelny offers a hawk that “chooses a roost which maximises 
its view of  its hunting territory” and the laying down of  pheromone trails between next and 
food sources by some ant species as examples of  epistemic action (Sterelny, 2010, p470). The 
former case exploits the scaffolding potential of  a perch favourable to one individual and its 
task, while in the latter combined activity of  many individuals contributes to making a 
cognitive niche or scaffolded space in which simple pheromone-cued dispositions can 
efficiently gather food. The trails ‘carry information about direction and distance’ and, given 
the trail making and following dispositions, the intensity of  a trail ‘carries information about 
the value of  the food resource’ (Sterelny 2003, p19, drawing on Hölldobler & Wilson 1990, 
pp272-3). Our focus here is on scaffolding rather than either epistemic actions or niches, even 
though some scaffolding might be produced by or depend on epistemic actions, and even 
though an accumulation of  scaffolding might add up to a niche. 
 
We called the characterisation above neutral to signal that it doesn’t require that scaffolding 
be helpful to the agent engaged in the task. That scaffolding is helpful generally goes without 
saying, and examples offered in the literature to defend the claim that cognition is scaffolded, 
are overwhelmingly helpful. We call such scaffolding benign, and fill this out as follows: Benign 
Cognitive Scaffolding is external structure that changes the cognitive demands of  a task in ways 
that serve the interests of  the agent attempting the task. 
 
Just as we count something as scaffolding at all in a way that is task and agent relative, 
whether it is benign is interest relative. Scaffolding is benign when it serves the agent’s actual 
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interests, which needn’t be known to or appreciated by the agent. When those interests can be 
clearly identified, and are themselves consistent, then whether the scaffolding is benign or not 
can be correspondingly clear. It often is clear, as the examples reviewed above, and the wider 
literature on scaffolding, shows. It may also sometimes be difficult to determine, for example 
when a task contributes to multiple goals in heterogenous ways, or there are competing 
credible accounts of  the agent’s interests. A slide rule, for example, might augment my 
computational powers, while unpleasantly reminding me of  a cruel mathematics teacher many 
years ago. We propose two strategies for dealing with challenging cases. The more difficult one 
is to defend a position on the agent’s overall interests in order to show how they are being 
benefited by the scaffolding given the task. The simpler alternative is to take the success 
conditions of  the task itself  to determine a local interest, which scaffolding either serves or 
does not. We’ll use both strategies in what follows. 
 
Many examples of  benign scaffolding involve cues or surface indicators in an 
environment: objects placed as reminders, pheromone trails, road markings and conventional 
signage for bathrooms and elevators in public spaces. While using some of  these cues might 
depend on significant on-board resources, including competence with symbolic systems or 
public language, considered as scaffolding they are relatively superficial. Not all scaffolding is like 
this - the slide rule that converts mathematical operations into physical manipulations, also 
requiring some numerical competence from the user, isn’t merely a favourably situated label or 
cue, but the instantiation of  a large number of  structured relationships that works because the 
normal range of  manipulations preserve those relationships. That is, subject to the markings 
being correctly read, the manipulations can do significant computational work. When it 
matters to draw the distinction, which is very much one of  degree, we’ll call the former, 
superficial scaffolding ‘shallow’ and the instances where significant computational work gets 
done externally, including transforming inferences of  one kind into manipulations or 
processes of  a different kind, ‘deep’. The deep shallow distinction is independent of  the 
identification of  scaffolding as benign, or — as we’ll see shortly — hostile. 
 
Examples of  deep benign scaffolding are readily found. Consider a month planner with 
days of  the week arranged in regular columns or rows, with already planned activities filled in. 
The same set of  facts could be stored on scraps of  paper — one for each engagement — and 
kept in a bag marked ‘April’. By mapping calendar time onto spatial relationships in an orderly 
way, the month planner transforms tedious, time-consuming and error-prone enquiries into 
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quick visual searches and inferences. (Compare using the bag of  notes and the planner to 
identify two adjacent, available weekdays suitable for scheduling an event.) Navigation maps 
distort some aspects of  physical space in order to preserve others, for example so that straight 
lines on the map pick out locations with shared directional relationships, at the cost of  
accurately representing scale (Hutchins 1995, Chapter 3). Many underground train maps 
distort distances and directions so as to facilitate queries and inferences focused on 
topological relationships between passenger stations and different services (Kent 2021). That 
using these resources typically requires some skill from the user doesn’t make a difference to 
the key point: desk planners, slide rules, some maps, numeral systems and routines for long-
division, etc., are forms of  deep scaffolding which depend on the structure of  the scaffolding 
itself, and whether it successfully preserves (including under manipulation) a version of  some 
favoured set of  relationships. This is a difference of  degree, and allows boundary cases. An 
individual spot of  ant pheromone is a plausible instance of  shallow scaffolding, but an 
accumulation of  them into a trail can carry additional information because of  their 
relationships with each other and further facts. A pheromone trail is less shallow than an 
individual spot. 
 
The claim that there can be deep scaffolding is a version of  the claim that cognition itself  
can be extended, a thesis often defended with functionalist considerations. Functionalists hold 
that mental or cognitive states are distinguished at least primarily by the causal and functional 
relations they stand in with inputs, behaviours and other cognitive states. What Wheeler (2010) 
calls the ‘chauvinism-busting’ property of  multiple realizability holds that systems that stand in 
the right kinds of  causal and functional role, even though they might work or be composed in 
importantly different ways, can be cognitively equivalent. The label extended functionalism 
makes explicit that one of  the chauvinisms being busted is internalism about cognition. The 
extended functionalist does not require or presuppose that the functional chains implementing 
cognition remain bounded by skull or skin, and is, for example, willing to grant that features 
of  the anatomy and position of  one or more legs in conjunction with local sensors can 
constitute parts of  the loops in a neural network controller while taking a different form to 
the internal ‘wired’ connections (Beer et al 1993, discussed in Clark 1997). 
2.2 Hostility and Scaffolding 
 
We can now characterise hostile scaffolding. This isn’t merely scaffolding that fails to be 
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benign by being inefficient or unreliable, and so doesn’t serve the interests of  the agent 
attempting a task. A calendar that somehow encouraged inaccurate inferences, or consumed 
more time than it saved, could fall short of  being benign, but wouldn’t thereby serve another 
agent. Hostile scaffolding both fails to be benign in undermining the interests of  the agent 
attempting the task and by doing so serving the interest of  another agent: Hostile Cognitive 
Scaffolding is external structure that changes the cognitive demands of  a task in ways that 
undermine the interests of  the agent attempting the task, and serve those of  another agent. 
 
We take the term hostile here, as noted, from Sterelny (2003) who distinguished between 
informational environments as follows. In an informationally transparent environment signals an 
organism can detect are reliably good occasions for behaviours it is capable of  producing, so 
cue-driven behaviour will be successful (Sterelny 2003, p. 20). Environments aren’t reliably 
transparent. When relevant features of  the environment “map in complex, one to many ways 
onto the cues [an organism] can detect” they are informationally translucent (Sterelny 2003, p. 21). 
Sometimes the translucency is not the result of  indifferent heterogeneity in the world, but is 
produced by other living things with competing interests, in which case the environment is 
informationally hostile. That is, hostility is not merely a matter of  antagonistic or competing 
interests existing, but concerns their expression through information. (We’re only taking 
Sterelny’s account of  hostility from this, and won’t make further reference to the notion of  
transparency.)  
 
Sterelny’s emphasis on hostility is a corrective to over-optimistic slogans in artificial 
intelligence and robotics about letting the world be its own model, or own best representation 
(Brooks 1991; Clark 1997, p46). Control systems based on responding to cues depend on the 
reliability of  the cues, but their predictable responsiveness is an opportunity for exploitation. 
Sterelny surveys examples including female Photuris fireflies that engage in aggressive mimicry 
by producing the mating signals of  females of  other firefly species in order to attract, kill and 
eat males of  those species (Sterelny 2003, p15; Lloyd 1997). He argues that when the 
investment pays its way expanded cognitive capacities that are less cue-bound, including 
proto-beliefs and proto-desires, can be a strategy for dealing with translucence and hostility. It 
is also central to his view that humans have long been distinctive in the extent of  their reliance 
on scaffolding, and in their cultivation and maintenance of  cognitive niches that support 
mastering the extraordinary informational demands of  their lifestyles (Sterelny 2010, 2012). 
Given his emphases on hostility and scaffolding, it might seem surprising that Sterelny doesn’t  
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develop an account of  hostile scaffolding. Rather, he’s argued it is unlikely to be a serious 
problem, focusing on how shared resources are made reliable by being shared, and that the 
costs of  exploiting by means of  scaffolding are unlikely to be covered by the returns (Sterelny, 
2010, p474). We return to his reasons for scepticism, and respond to them, in section (4.3) 
below. 
 
Just as whether scaffolding is benign is relative to task, agent and interests, so whether it is 
hostile is relative to the task and interests of  one agent, and the interests of  another. Recall the 
slide rule that extends my calculating capacities while bringing painful memories. If  my task is 
being in a good mood, then the ruler might fail to be benign (it certainly isn’t helping) but that 
doesn’t make it hostile, because nobody is benefiting. Hostile scaffolding, if  there is any, has 
both victims and beneficiaries. Since only the victim need be engaged in a task, determining 
whether the scaffolding benefits another agent will depend on the of  the beneficiary and their 
interests. In section (3) below we look at this in cases which fix interests by reference to gene 
replication, and in section (4) we link interests to returns in money. 
3. Extended Cognition and Extended Phenotypes 
 
Dawkins (1982) argues that phenotypes reach beyond the skin. This claim applies to 
construction such as spider webs, and to the behaviour of  other organisms. We argue that the 
extended phenotype thesis and extended functionalism about cognition (the latter including 
the possibility of  deep scaffolding and extended cognition) are complementary in hitherto 
neglected ways, and together predict the possibility of  deep hostile scaffolding. The 
complementarity is twofold: First, extended functionalism provides additional ways of  
thinking about manipulation and behaviour control than standard expositions of  the extended 
phenotype thesis. Second, the extended phenotype thesis pays close attention to contested 
control and attempted manipulation, which is salutary for standard expositions of  extended 
cognition focusing on benign extensions. 
 
The extended phenotype thesis is a development of  the gene-centric perspective on 
natural selection, which prioritises the interests of  replicators (in being replicated) over those 
of  the organism in which they occur (Dawkins 1976a). This perspective is defended against 
individual-level selectionism by theoretical considerations, such as that only relatively digital 
gene sequences have enough copying fidelity and potential ‘immortality’ to be the target of  
Hostile Scaffolding: Working Version 
10 
selection, and by its explaining cases where genes replicate at the expense of  the interests of  
their host organism.3  The gene-centric perspective coincides with the individual organism 
one, when the respective interests align, so claims about extended phenotypes can often be 
formulated independently of  the gene-centric perspective. Nothing that follows here depends 
on the accepting the gene-centric view. 
 
The ‘phenotype’ of  an organism is commonly understood as the bodily expression, in 
morphology, physiology and behaviour, of  the genotype. Conventional thinking was that 
phenotypes were bounded by the skin. As with extended cognition, the extended phenotype 
thesis is defended by arguments that common assumptions about boundaries are incorrect, 
and that we will be unable to explain important phenomena unless we ditch these 
assumptions. In one case, the presumption is that cognition is bounded by skin or skull, in the 
other it is that the phenotype is bounded by the skin — or scales, bark, etc. — of  the 
organism. Both deploy the extended functionalist thought that standing in appropriate causal 
relationships is more important than falling on one or the other side of  some boundary 
(Dawkins 1976b, p8). In the case of  gene-centric selection, the relevant causal relationships 
are effects (under typical genetic, developmental and environmental conditions) on the rate at 
which a gene is replicated. So, Dawkins points out, some organisms reliably modify the world 
outside their own skins in ways that are crucial to their biological success, such as beavers 
building dams. Their capacities and dispositions to make these modifications, including wood-
cutting teeth and disliking the sound of  running water, can have a heritable (genetic) basis. 
When they do the constructions should be considered as part of  the phenotype irrespective 
of  whether they are ‘inside’ the host’s body or not. So, if  there replicators that under typical 
conditions increase the likelihood of  building dams, or building them this way rather than 
that, then there are ‘genes for’ dam building, and dams are part of  the phenotype. Dawkins 
argues that causal relationships should guide our thinking, whether or not the chains of  
causation cross the skin: “…an animal artefact, like any other phenotypic product whose 
variation is influenced by a gene, can be regarded as a phenotypic tool by which that gene 
could potentially lever itself  into the next generation.” (1982, p199). Whether the levering is 
 
3  One example of this is the ‘Medea’ gene (for Maternal effect dominant embryonic arrest) in flour beetles, which 
produces – in effect – both a toxin and its antidote. An individual with the gene suffers no net effect, 
besides paying the cost of producing a molecule it goes on to deactivate, and those without it are normal. A 
heterozygous female beetle expresses Medea (producing the toxin) in her germline, where only half of her 
young produce the antidote, while the others die during larval development (Beeman et al 1992). This 
phenotypic difference does not serve the reproductive interests of heterozygous individuals. 
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achieved by ‘adorning the tail of  a male bird of  paradise with a sexually attractive blue feather’ 
or by ‘causing a male bower bird to paint his bower with pigment crushed in his bill out of  
blue berries’ doesn’t matter. Levers are multiply realised, and can be extended. 
 
Some extended phenotypes involve extended cognition or benign scaffolding. Dawkins 
urges us to see a spider’s web as “a temporary functional extension of  her body, a huge 
extension of  the effective catchment area of  her predatory organs” (1982, p198). Clark,  when 
defending extended cognition, repeatedly draws an analogy with Dawkins’ use of  this example 
(e.g. 1997, 2008, p118; pp241-242). Webs and dams are constructions, one category of  
extended phenotype. The other involves manipulating the behaviour of  other organisms to 
serve replicators in another. Here an example, not from Dawkins. The Lymantria dispar virus 
causes infected European gypsy moth larvae to climb up their host trees before dying, 
liquefying and releasing spores of  the virus. The behaviour of  uninfected individuals includes 
reducing predation risk by hiding in tree bark, or climbing down to the soil (Hoover et al 
2011).  Dawkins discusses various real and hypothetical examples, including the increased 
tendency of  those infected by rabies to bite, which would plausibly serve transmission of  the 
pathogen which is carried in saliva, but does no good for the host (Dawkins 1982, p220). He 
offers as the ‘central theorem’ of  his view that: “An animal’s behaviour tends to maximize the 
survival of  the genes ‘for’ that behaviour, whether or not those genes happen to be in the 
body of  the particular animal performing it.” (Dawkins 1982, p233) 
 
Dawkins’ account of  genetic ‘action at a distance’ focuses on how a gene in one organism 
could influence the behaviour of  another organism. Sometimes we can be confident 
influencing is happening, including with cuckoo eggs and cuckoo chicks which depend on 
successfully getting past the defences of  nesting birds subject to brood parasitism. Feeding a 
cuckoo chick does not advance their interests at all, but is very much in the interests of  the 
cuckoo. Dawkins considers two mechanisms (sometimes speculatively illustrated) to 
manipulate behaviour: sensory cues, and neural interventions like drugs, or short-circuits. In 
the cuckoo case, he emphasises cues: The parasitised reed-warbler “is an active, complex 
machine, with sense organs, muscles and a brain. The brood parasite must […] infiltrate the 
defences of  the host's nervous system, and its ports of  entry are the host's sense organs.” 
(Dawkins 1982, p68) 
 
Cuckoo brood parasitism evolved independently three times (Payne 2005) and the various 
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arms races between host and parasite species differ widely. Cuckoo chicks eject other eggs and 
chicks, but still need hosts to feed them more than they would one of  their own (smaller) 
chicks. Some of  this is achieved through exaggerated versions of  species-specific feeding cues. 
Rufous bush chats in Spain, where cuckoo chicks have orange gapes, bring more food to 
chicks of  their own whose mouths have been dyed orange (Alvarez 2004). Orange dye makes 
no difference to reed-warbler parents in England, who instead bring more food to their own 
young in response to recordings of  cuckoo chick begging calls (Davies, Kilner & Noble 1998; 
Davies 2015, Chapter 10). These are exemplary cases of  informational hostility, exploiting 
cue-sensitive behavioural dispositions (see Sterelny 2003, p27-28). 
 
Sensory cues aren’t the only ways to exert influence because, says Dawkins, a “nervous 
system can be subverted if  treated in the right way” (1982, p69) including being “vulnerable to 
manipulation by a clever-enough pharmacologist” (1982, p71). The scenarios Dawkins 
entertains for genetic ‘action at a distance’ include influence by pheromones and by parasites 
within host nervous systems, and all suppose that the downstream effects of  replicators must 
somehow get at the brain or nerves of  the organism to influence it, whether they do so through 
the sensory front door or a neural or metabolic service elevator. The founding treatment of  
extended phenotypes, that is, does not contemplate extended cognition. Japyassú and Laland 
(2017) go so far as to suggest that Dawkins’ internalism about cognition is analogous to his 
gene-centrism. Whatever the reason, we maintain that extended functionalism about cognition 
complements the extended phenotype view: If  cognition can be extended and distributed 
beyond the skin, including by means of  deep scaffolding, others means of  action at a distance 
may be available. The possibility that interests us is influence by hostile scaffolding, that is 
external structure that transforms the cognitive demands of  a task in a way serving another 
agent. 
 
Notice that a case of  an extended phenotype operating through hostile scaffolding would 
have to satisfy two conditions. First, features of  the hostile scaffolding would have to be 
among the downstream effects of  a gene. Second, the interests to be served are the replication 
of  instances of  that gene, through further downstream effects of  the exploited agent 
interacting with the scaffolding. The functional chain has to go from a gene through the 
scaffolding and back to the gene. These are important restrictions from the gene-centric 
perspective, which has a standard way of  handling all questions about interests. But neither is 
required for hostile scaffolding more generally. First, our fairly permissive notion of  
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scaffolding (section 2 above) allows for scaffolding that is both found and made. Road 
markings are scaffolding for all road users, not merely for those who paint them. Second, 
we’re willing to contemplate any reasonably defended position about the actual interests 
served, or to associate interests with the success conditions of  the task being attempted. There 
could consequently be examples of  hostile scaffolding that don’t count as extended 
phenotypes. 
 
The second restriction above, making a difference to the replicators responsible for the 
extended phenotypic difference does important work in Dawkins’ account, because without 
something like it all of  the varied downstream effects of  genes would be counted as 
phenotype (Dawkins 1982, pp. 233-4). A similar danger threatens our characterisation of  
hostile scaffolding, because of  the possibility that arbitrary agents would gain in some way 
from merely inefficient scaffolding that failed to serve the interests of  its user. Suppose, for 
example, that a person is so captivated by an appealing time-management tool to scaffold their 
scheduling that they take time away from the very work they were trying to organise, and are 
beaten by a competitor. The scaffolding fails to serve their interests and another agent benefits. 
This consequence is unwelcome, because the idea of  hostility that we are taking from Sterelny 
(2003) concerns the expression of  competition in an informational environment. We therefore 
require that the agent benefitting be ‘in the loop’ that influences the placing or significant 
features of  the structure that is a candidate for hostile scaffolding. So, if  the competitor had 
recommended the time-management tool hoping for it to be counter-productive, we’d have a 
case of  attempted hostile scaffolding, and if  successful a real example. 
 
We earlier distinguished between shallow and deep scaffolding, where the latter involved 
significant processing happening outside the skin. This allows us to distinguish less and more 
interesting versions of  the claim that there can be hostile scaffolding, including among non-
human animals. The less interesting version concerns shallow scaffolding. Cases where the 
activity of  an organism modifies its own environment to support behaviour selection, as some 
insects do with pheromone trails, count as benign scaffolding or cognitive niche-construction. 
Examples of  manipulation where other organisms produce relevantly similar cues in ways that 
bias activity to serve the interests of  the manipulators would then count as hostile scaffolding. 
Both cases transform the cognitive environment and influence activity but differ in whose 
interests are served. (This is what the ‘central theorem’ of  the extended phenotype warns us 
not to take for granted.) It is less interesting to call manipulation by cues hostile scaffolding, 
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because that’s merely renaming what is amply covered by existing accounts of  aggressive 
mimicry, cryptic colouration and other phenomena, covered in Sterelny’s (2003) account of  
the threats of  hostility to cue-bound behaviour, and by Dawkins’ own treatment of  
manipulation by cues (1982). This part of  our view may be salutary for the over-optimistic 
literature on human scaffolding, but only delivers one of  the two complementarities between 
extended phenotype and extended cognition that we identified. 
 
Both come into play with deep scaffolding, where significant computational or processing 
work depends on external structure. The non-obvious and more interesting claim is that deep 
hostile scaffolding is possible. This would go beyond the ‘sensory cues or drugs’ range of  options 
Dawkins offers for thinking about action at a distance, and require extended functionalism 
about cognition. We admit not having plausible non-human examples of  deep hostile 
scaffolding. Hypothetically, a creature that laid malicious pheromone trails to lead ants to their 
death would constitute deep hostile scaffolding, if  we count the benign trails as deep 
scaffolding (section 2.1 above). In the following section we argue that there are real human 
examples of  deep hostile scaffolding.  
4. Real hostile scaffolding 
 
Our main examples of  deep hostile scaffolding are drawn from electronic gambling 
machines and aspects of  casino management. The gambling customer might be pursuing 
multiple goals, including recreation or entertainment, and cannot safely be presumed to have 
the goal of  winning money overall. Most of  our discussion therefore focuses on a specific 
task that arises periodically for the gambler: determining whether to continue wagering. This 
might be answered deliberately or by pre-reflective or implicit appraisal - specifying the task 
doesn’t commit to a method of  resolution. The decision whether to not to continue, though, 
is a point where the interests of  player and house can come apart, because the player who 
stops gambling stops losing to the house. 
 
Rachlin wrote that in “a way (not to be taken too literally) the casino serves the decision 
theorist, as the heavens have served the physicist, as a natural laboratory.” (1989, p105-6). His 
point was that games of  chance played for money provided a series of  choice episodes with 
definite timing and magnitudes of  cost and payout in a single modality, offering clean data for 
the decision scientist analogous to how the mostly frictionless motion of  approximately 
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spherical celestial bodies served physics. Casinos and gambling machine designers, however, 
don’t merely study choice, they aim to exploit it. Some of  the tools deployed to this end 
involve ambience, layout, lighting and sound, and a leading handbook of  casino management 
(Friedman 2000) favours thinking of  casinos as mazes (in Schüll 2012, p39). Much of  this 
effort is aimed at prolonging gambling episodes. Some of  the means involve scaffolding, some 
of  it predominantly affective and motivational, more more conventionally cognitive. 
4.1 Affective Hostility 
 
Affective scaffolding that is unreliably benign isn’t hard to find. Technology in smart 
watches and other devices that track activity or proxies for stress level, for example, could 
contribute to an entirely beneficial improvement in someone’s self-care. When these tools 
involve significant external processing, fed back to the user, they can count as deep 
scaffolding. One reason to doubt that such gadgets are reliably benign is provided by Nguyen 
(2020, Chapter 9). He argues that technologies that ‘gamify’ some areas of  life have insidiously 
distorting effects on the agency of  a user seduced by the simplicity of  the numerical feedback 
into neglect of  the more demanding and less certain practical reasoning that rational agency 
requires. If  he’s right, the scaffolding could fail to be benign for some tasks, but fall short of  
making it hostile if  the harms were by-products without beneficiary. The same tracking 
technology could become clearly hostile if, hypothetically, used by an exploitative employer to 
increase the efficiency of  value extraction in ways harmful to the interests of  employees. Slaby 
(2016) argues for something like this, although he’s primarily concerned with the downstream 
effects of  what we would call shallow (affective) hostile scaffolding.  
 
Casino player tracking technology is a credible example of  deep hostile scaffolding (Schüll 
2012, Chapter 5). The first player tracking system in casinos was implemented in 1985 and 
mimicked ‘loyalty’ systems from airlines and banks (Schüll 2012, p144). Players were given 
punch cards that were notched with every jackpot. After enough notches, cards could be 
redeemed various rewards, providing an incentive to keep gambling, and gathering data for 
casinos. Contemporary tracking is much more sophisticated. Casinos now track the value of  
every bet, a player’s win and lose rate, the rate of  button pressing on machine games, the 
timing of  breaks, and details of  food and drink purchases, over a player’s entire history, 
perhaps in multiple venues (Schüll 2012, p144). In 2005, Harrah formulated a plan to 
“optimize” player value with a system estimating, given historical data, how much a player 
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could lose over how long while still continuing play. The system predicted a ‘pain point’ for 
the individual player, and dispatched a ‘Luck Ambassador’ to give out vouchers (for further 
gambling, meals, or show tickets) shortly before the pain point (Schüll 2012, p154). That 
system backfired because players, especially the most valuable ones, didn’t like being 
interrupted (Schüll 2012, p169f), but less obtrusive and disruptive interventions — including 
directly and instantly distributing non-cashable credits to the players at individual machines, 
and allowing refreshments to be ordered from the machines — have taken their place. Some 
machines disable animations or other features when players play fast enough, adjusting their 
behaviour to the revealed preference for a rate of  interaction (Schüll 2012, p168-9), and 
multiline machines offer frequent small ‘wins’ (some of  them net losses) in ways that 
encourage prolonged play (Dixon et al 2014). Colombetti and Krueger (2015) include 
gambling machines and environments in their examples of  affective scaffolding, and note how 
these machines, especially ones responsive to player behaviour ‘induce an extreme state of  
absorption and isolation’ in players, and are aware that this is in the service of  casino revenues. 
Their main focus is on arguing that affectivity too, is sometimes scaffolded, and they use 
machine gambling environments as a powerful example of  entrenchment into a corporal 
schema. We want to emphasise that the scaffolding can also be hostile, and the induced state 
of  absorption harmful or associated with increased vulnerability. Some gambling researchers, 
seeking to highlight this, have called the flow-like state induced in some machine gamblers 
‘dark flow’ (Dixon et al, 2017). 
 
The stated aim, and common effect, of  most of  these innovation is to prolong gambling, 
and reduce the interval between gambling sessions. Revenue from gambling machines, which 
provide the most detailed player tracking data, is a function of  ‘time on device’ and rate of  
play, which are what venues and designers seek to maximise. With the increasing 
sophistication of  the machines themselves, machine gambling has sharply risen in the fraction 
of  casino revenue it contributes, the fraction of  casino space allocated to it, and the number 
of  available machines. At the same time, machine gambling addiction has become more 
common, and come to account for the majority of  cases of  gambling addiction, with the 
onset of  addiction in cases of  machine gambling being dramatically quicker than for other 
forms of  gaming (Schüll 2012, p4-6, 14-21). 
 
Player tracking systems coupled with attempts to predict the cessation of  play, and 
postpone it with interventions that cost the house less than it expects to extract, are exemplary 
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cases of  deep hostile scaffolding. This is, as noted above, a conflict played out over the task of  
deciding whether to continue gambling, where player interests and those of  the house come 
apart. It is ‘scaffolding’ because the influence on player behaviour is facilitated through 
external structures that transform task demands. It is ‘deep’ in the sense that casinos are 
gathering and processing historical and real-time player data to estimate the affective and 
motivational states of  players and manipulate upcoming events (such as those shortly before 
the predicted pain point) to prolong play. It is ‘hostile’ because the main goal is extracting 
more money by prolonging play and not serving the player’s own interests.   
4.2 Cognitive Hostility 
 
The hostility in contemporary gambling technology is not limited to the affective and 
motivational, and includes compelling instances of  deep hostile cognitive scaffolding. To make 
this case we turn to selected features of  the development of  slot machines, leaving aside 
poker-based and other games some of  which involve different forms of  hostile scaffolding. 
The earliest slot machines were mechanical. Several adjacent spinning cylindrical reels with 
visible symbols at intervals, and a number of  stopping points for each reel, were set up so that 
they would pay out under certain conditions. The 1899 ‘Liberty Bell’, for example, had three 
reels each with five symbols, and one stopping point for and between each symbol. This 
machine accepted and paid out in nickels after the reels were set in motion by a player pulling 
a handle. (One nickel to play, ten dispensed when all three reels stopped on bells.) The reels 
were stopped by a braking system and timing bar, so each stopped individually. The small 
number of  possible outcomes meant that modest payouts were required to keep the machine 
profitable (Schüll 2012, p80). 
 
Early mechanical slot machines had some benign scaffolding-like features. The number of  
symbols on the reels, their spacing and motion, could be observed through the viewing 
window, and reliably related – in fair machines, with repeated observation – to the actual odds. 
Apparent near misses, for example where only one reel was one stop away from a payout 
configuration, were genuine. Later electronic gambling machines broke the connection 
between the visible reels and the odds, allowing it to be distorted, and for apparent near-
misses to multiply as the odds of  winning went down. One key innovation was using 
electronic random number generators to determine the outcome of  play. This gave designers 
and owners more precise control over the odds than mechanical systems, a change partly sold 
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as a way of  blocking tampering. After the introduction of  random number generators, the 
visible spinning was no longer the process that culminated with the outcome of  play, instead it 
was an animation reverse-engineered to present the already processed output of  the random 
number generator. 
 
This made possible the innovation called ‘virtual reel mapping’ (Schüll 2012, p81f; Enkvist 
2009, p166f; Telnaes 1984). This brings it about that the odds of  winning are different from, 
and can be considerably lower than, what the appearance of  the reels suggests. Lower actual 
odds enable larger, more tempting jackpots to be offered while keeping machines profitable. It 
was trivial to make the actual odds low by having the random number generator select an 
outcome from as large a range as the machine designer or casino wanted. Virtual reel mapping 
was a solution to the problem of  relating the output of  the random number generator 
configured to give lower odds of  winning to the activity of  the simulated reels, while keeping 
the appearance of  the machine the same. The key is that the randomization process, over a 
larger set of  outcomes than is actually displayed, is ‘mapped’ onto the simulated reels in a 
biased way, with disproportionately more of  the virtual stops mapped onto “low-paying or 
non-paying blank positions” on the visible reel (Schüll, 2012, p87). The larger the number of  
non-paying stops, the more non-paying combinations, and the larger the jackpot that could be 
offered. 
 
The intent to separate the motion and stopping of  the visible reels from the actual odds is 
explicit in the patent, which introduces the innovation as “enabling any odds to be set without 
changing the physical characteristics of  the machine” (Telnaes 1984, p1), and explains that 
“the purpose of  this invention [is] to increase the capability of  the designer to include high 
payoffs without increased physical size of  the machine and with uniform presentation of  the 
games of  different models to the player” (Telnaes 1984, p8). It was possible to lengthen the 
odds with an ‘honest’ display by having more or larger reels. But players correctly perceive such 
machines “as being less “good” in terms of  winning and payout chances” (Telnaes 1984, p8). 
So, said Telnaes, “it is important to make a machine that is perceived to present greater chances 
of  payoff  that it actually has within the legal limitations that games of  chance must operate” 
(1984, p8, emphasis added). The visible reels retain the scaffolding-like properties found in 
mechanical machines. The movement of  apparently rigid cylinders with regularly spaced 
symbols encourage inferences about chances, and contribute to what the patent calls player 
‘acceptance’. But the inferences encouraged are inaccurate because the actual odds differ from 
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what the reels suggest, and the deal players are encouraged to ‘accept’ by the appearance of  
the machine is considerably more skewed against their interests (in expected money) than it 
seems. This is deep hostile scaffolding, leading to prolonged play. 
 
A good question at this point is why this works so well, given that prolonged play is also 
an opportunity to learn from experience of  losing to the house. Part, by no means all, of  the 
answer in some machines is the extent of  investment in encouraging trust in the scaffolding 
features themselves. Slot machine manufacturers have paid considerable attention to 
cultivating the sense of  interaction with a genuine physical apparatus. The manufacturer Bally 
once held a leading position because their machines’ handles could be pulled more or less 
quickly, with apparent haptic feedback about the progressive loading of  reel springs (Schüll, 
2012, p83; Enkvist 2009, p164f). The virtual reel mapping technology posed challenges for the 
gambling machine industry because it broke that link, and companies explored different ways 
of  simulating convincing mechanical interaction, and filed various patents aimed at achieving 
the feel of  the mechanical handle, without giving players any genuine control. Ekvist quotes a 
registered patent that referred to the “certain amount of  feel and presumed control over the 
device” (Ekvist 2009, p165, emphasis added). Handles were eventually found to slow down 
play unacceptably, and button-push play initiation came to dominate. Other attention focused 
on the movement of  the reels controlled by step-motors, or the animation of  simulated reels, 
again to encourage the sense of  genuine physical interaction. One solution was to layer semi-
transparent computer graphics over genuine but blank spinning reels, another to stack liquid 
crystal displays to enhance the appearance of  depth (Schüll 2012, p83). Yet another allowed 
players to stop the apparent spinning. Although this made no difference to the outcome, 
“gamblers using such “stop” features seem to feel they have an effect on outcomes and […] to 
persist at play for significantly longer periods” (Schüll 2012, p84).4 This sense of  interacting 
with something that behaves like a genuine physical object, even when it isn’t one and when its 
actual dynamics are different and concealed, is important to the coupling (Sutton 2010), or the 
complementarity (Menary 2010), that makes these machines operate as deep scaffolding even 
when serving the operator over the player. 
 
 
4  One patent that includes attention to controlling the system when players have the option to stop reels, 
observes that it “is generally known in the art that the movement of the symbols up to four frames after the 
actuation of the stop button does not give an unnatural impression to the player”, and describes a strategy 
to control displayed outcomes consistent with avoiding this ‘unnatural impression’ (Okada 1986, p27). 
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The fact that the sometimes simulated reels are controlled after outcome determination, 
allows another form of  misrepresentation. We noted above that on a fair mechanical machine, 
apparent near misses are genuine. Near misses are also motivating (a point suggested in 
Skinner 1953, p397), leading to extended machine playing time (Strickland & Grote 1967, Reid 
1986, Clark et al 2009)5 and may be distinctively motivating for disordered gamblers 
(Sescousse et al 2016). One of  the earliest innovations in mechanical slots was expanding the 
viewing window vertically, allowing more genuine near misses to be seen (Schüll 2012, p80). 
When the reel mapping and display are entirely under designer control apparent near misses 
can be made more frequent. This requires stopping the reels so that the final configuration 
looks as though a small difference – at minimum a single reel stopping one step earlier or later 
– would have led to a winning play. One Nevada industry dispute centred on this, because a 
line of  machines which presented apparent near-misses several times more often than chance, 
by yet another patented method, were gaining market share from competitors (Harrigan 2008, 
Enkvist 2009).6 Although the outcome was that some kinds of  fabricated near miss were ruled 
unacceptable, this doesn’t affect our point about deep hostile scaffolding, which is that an 
apparatus designed to cultivate a strong sense of  having the dynamics of  a real physical 
machine, so as to encourage visual properties being taken as proxies for probabilities, was used 
to exploit players to the advantage of  casinos. In addition, the ‘banning’ of  fabricated near-
misses is restricted, and misleadingly frequent apparent near-misses an inevitable by-product 
of  virtual reel mapping. This is because the grouping of  several non-paying virtual stops 
either side of  a winning symbol will routinely make that symbol appear to stop ‘one stop away’ 
from a winning position more frequently (Harrigan 2008). The ‘legal limitations’ at work in 
this industry fall far short of  preventing many forms of  deception and manipulation. 
 
That most users of  slot machines play voluntarily, and that the activity is presented and 
often understood as a form of  entertainment, does not affect our point here. To reiterate, 
hostility need not be an all or nothing affair, and is relative to a task and the interests of  two 
agents. The customer who enters the casino for fun, willing spend some time and lose some 
money while having it, still faces the periodic task of  determining whether they have had 
enough yet. And the house gains if  that question doesn’t arise at all, or is answered negatively. 
 
5  That there is a ‘near miss’ effect is not universally accepted. See Pisklak, Yong & Spetch (2020). 
6  Universal Distributors patented a system which generated high numbers of apparent near misses, and 
received regulatory approval for it. “Universal’s “near-miss” software increased the excitement during play 
and extended the average length of each gambling session, therefore resulting in a higher player appeal” 
(Enkvist 2009, p174, Okada 1986). 
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Suppose we consider the overall interests of  customers, instead of  focusing narrowly on the 
task of  deciding whether to continue wagering at any point. While gambling addicts might 
have a conflicted relationship to their gambling, it is uncontroversial that someone who isn’t 
gambling addict has no interest in becoming one. The considerations we noted above about 
the faster onset and increased prevalence of  gambling addiction with the rise of  the new 
machines suggest that the overall interests of  customers are not being served. Hostile 
scaffolding helps turn recreation into exploitation. 
 
Our position here complements an account offered by Ross (2020) who draws a useful 
contrast between non-human mammal and human encounters with targets of  addiction. 
Elephants and baboons can and do get drunk when they find low-toxicity sources of  alcohol, 
but “they are at no risk of  addiction […] because they cannot cultivate sources of  low-toxicity 
alcohol. Their parties are windfalls, the frequency of  which they cannot influence” (Ross 
2020, p. 6). Technological innovation has enabled humans, Ross contends, to ‘engineer 
addictive environments’, including by processing and stockpiling alcohol, nicotine and other 
substances, and by building environments, including casinos, that foster addiction. As Ross 
points out, part of  how this works in the machine gambling case is because our reward 
learning systems find the cycling of  action and feedback offered by gambling highly 
reinforcing, but are unable to ‘settle on a model of  genuine randomness’ (Ross 2020, p. 3). He 
argues that it’s not reasonable to say that there is anything wrong with mammalian learning 
systems, including those of  gambling addicts, given that evolutionary history did not require 
them to cope with anything like electronic gambling machines. Rather, we should recognise 
the role of  exploitative environments, including the exploitative learning environments that 
are the ‘business model’ (Ross 2020, p. 7) of  casinos, in explaining addiction. We add only that 
casinos aren’t merely exploitative learning environments, but are augmented with deep hostile 
scaffolding. 
4.3 An objection 
 
We noted above that Sterelny, although sensitive to the importance of  both scaffolding 
and hostility, has said that he doesn’t think manipulation of  public epistemic resources is likely. 
He does say that “hostile manipulation of  [our] informational environment is a serious 
danger”, however sees the danger as restricted it to a limited set of  interactions, mostly 
comprising “one-on-one high-stakes negotiations” (Sterelny, 2010, p474), such as someone 
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exploiting or harming the notebook-using Otto from Clark and Chalmers (1998) by erasing or 
altering Otto’s external memory. But for Sterelny, manipulation involving public resources 
(such as deceptively changing the maps in a subway station) is unlikely, because sharing itself  
increases reliability, and the fact that many agents use different copies of  the resources at 
unpredictable times makes it difficult to exploit a chosen target. “In many circumstances, 
public domain resources cannot safely be used to manipulate a specific target for a specific 
purpose” (Sterelny, 2010, p474). We’ll take these remarks as an objection, giving reasons to 
think that hostile scaffolding isn’t likely. 
 
Sterelny is of  course correct that much scaffolding is public, and characterised by 
considerable redundancy. One of  his examples is maps of  underground train systems, which 
are duplicated in stations, train carriages and printed media. Those resources scaffold the 
environment of  people faced with the task of  planning travel, and the maps themselves are 
often examples of  deep scaffolding that organise information in ways that simplify a selected 
class of  inferences (see section (2) above). It would take substantial effort and cost to 
manipulate such systems in order to misdirect a single passenger, and is consequently unlikely 
to bring sufficient returns. Another point that he makes, referring to the Monty Python sketch 
in which someone maliciously produces a Hungarian-English phrasebook leading users to 
make inappropriate and ridiculous utterances (‘My hovercraft is full of  eels’), and suggests that 
some of  the humour here arises because “it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which an 
author would gain from producing a maliciously misleading phrasebook, for an author cannot 
know when, where, by whom or with what effect such a book will be read” (Sterelny 2010, 
p275). Here, too, Sterelny is correct: Even if  an environmental intervention will mislead the 
agent who happens to rely on it, that doesn’t mean that the perpetrator will benefit. 
 
The considerations that Sterelny emphasises here aren’t, however, fully general. They limit 
the reach of  hostile scaffolding, but do not exclude it entirely. In the case of  affective 
scaffolding in casinos, a key part of  the story is that the casino itself  has extraordinarily 
comprehensive control over the whole environment, including its layout and design, and what 
opportunities for various kinds of  activities are to be found within it. Casino operators have 
conducted extensive research on ambience and spatial arrangements (Schüll 2012, chapter 1), 
and the player-tracking tools that seek to extend ‘time on device’ monitor players within these 
highly controlled environments. Players enjoy none of  the protections of  redundancy, but 
must muddle along in a hostile niche. The casino’s target isn’t a specific individual that needs 
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to be picked out of  a crowd but anyone and everyone who enters, and they have the capacity 
to track individuals in detail within their venues. Not only that, achieving similar levels of  
control over an environment doesn’t require command over a large physical space (as with 
casino-managers) because an increasing number of  the relevant environments people face 
today virtual, and the control has only to be achieved within a social media app, operating 
system or computer game. The potential victims of  a variety of  forms of  exploitation carry 
increasingly powerful and permanently connected computing devices around with them. So 
unlike the deceptive train map scenario Sterelny imagines, the targets broadcast their location 
and behaviour, and carry the instruments of  their possible bespoke exploitation around with 
them. In many of  these digital environments the very tools to optimise time on device 
developed in gambling have been deployed or modified, leading Harris, former Google design 
ethicist, to call a smartphone ‘The Slot Machine in Your Pocket’ (Harris 2016). That users 
often don’t directly pay in money is a dis-analogy with the casino case, but is irrelevant to the 
hostility, because much connected media and games extract advertising advertising revenue 
that is a function of  time on device. People on social media applications also have determine 
when to stop, and when to resume, and in both cases their interests and those of  providers 
can come apart. The malicious phrasebook prank is ‘ballistic’, its imagined perpetrator isolated 
from the consequences for victims. The casino knows who it is manipulating, as do social 
media and search companies who also much of  their users’ individual history, and what 
devices they are holding. To state the point here more generally, hostile scaffolding will pay its 
way when there are ways of  placing it around potential targets, and the costs are more than 
covered by the returns. The considerations that fix the boundaries between profitable and 
unprofitable scaffolding, and the challenges of  matching scaffolding to targets, are not fixed, 
but vary with available technology. Increasingly powerful, cheap, ubiquitous and connected 
computing devices make the robustness of  train maps small comfort indeed. Sterelny’s general 
warning to take hostility seriously stands, and optimism about scaffolding being reliably 
benign is in no better shape than optimism that the world is its own best representation. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Clark, who greatly raised the profile of  scaffolding, once wrote that the “single most 
important task, it seems to me, is to better understand the range and variety of  types of  
cognitive scaffolding, and the different ways in which non-biological scaffoldings can augment 
(or impair) performance on a task” (Clark 2002, p29). The parenthetical ‘or impair’ is a rare 
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interruption to his usually optimistic focus on benign scaffolding, and is repeated in the same 
paragraph when he says that the “Holy Grail here is a taxonomy of  different types of  external 
prop, and a systematic understanding of  how they help (and hinder) human performance” 
(Clark 2002, p29; also Clark 2010, p58f). We take our treatment of  hostile scaffolding to be a 
contribution to the task Clark highlighted, focused on his passing hints about unhelpful 
scaffolding, and significantly inspired by Sterelny’s (2003) working out of  the importance of  
informational hostility. 
 
We observed near the start of  this paper that our claims are not entirely unprecedented, 
and we close by noting what we view as complementarities and differences with some valuable 
recent work. Liao and Huebner (2020), first, have argued persuasively that there are 
‘oppressive things’, that is material artefacts and environments which contribute to 
oppression, when their effects are biased in the same direction as, and they are causally 
embedded in, an oppressive system. Liao and Huebner endorse two of  the four components 
of  4E cognition - that cognition is embedded, and embodied - say that they are ‘sympathetic’ to a 
third - that it is enactive - but say that neither of  them is ‘particularly committed’ to the fourth - 
that cognition is extended (2020, n3). This isn’t necessarily a rejection of  the possibility of  deep 
scaffolding, because they’re only distancing themselves from ‘first wave’ extended mind 
thinking (see Sutton 2010), but that is our main focus. Their concern with oppression, 
understood as a relationship between groups, is different from our understanding of  hostility 
which relates to individual agents. Liao and Huebner consequently don’t count an imagined 
biased slot machine as oppressive because it would harm ‘all players equally’ (2020, p8), 
although they are also aware that the organisation of  gambling industries exploits and 
maintains oppressive class relations. Our respective accounts will therefore sometimes pick 
out different examples, with hostile scaffolding including environmental structure that exploits 
individuals indifferently to their group membership. But they may also complement each 
other. In cases where something that works like hostile scaffolding makes more sense in 
relation to the interests of  groups than individuals, it may be better to refer to oppressive 
scaffolding. 
 
Slaby’s (2016) account of  ‘mind invasion’ is a further partial precedent. He argues that 
affective scaffolding in some environments, especially workplaces, can amount to a kind of  
‘mind invasion’ when it sculpts behaviour and norms in ways that are detrimental to the 
interests of  employees. Slaby criticises much thinking about extended cognition (and extended 
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minds) for taking for granted a ‘user/resource model’ which presumes that external structure 
will serve the interests of  the agents encountering it. This line of  criticism is somewhat 
analogous to Dawkins’ argument against assuming that the interests served by behaviour are 
those of  the agent performing the behaviour itself, and our own argument for taking hostile 
scaffolding seriously. Like Liao and Huebner, Slaby’s intention is partly political - in Slaby’s 
case drawing on Protevi’s reading of  Deleuze (Protevi 2012, p132). Again, this means that 
‘mind invasion’ and hostile scaffolding may pick out different examples, with the latter 
including cases of  individual exploitation beyond workplaces. In addition Slaby’s account 
focuses on affective scaffolding that we’d count as shallow, even if  its accumulated 
downstream effects can be substantial. So as well as picking out different examples, the case 
we’ve developed there covers different ground in considering scaffolding that is cognitively 
hostile, as well as deep in the sense of  doing significant cognitive work.  
 
In summary, while the literature on situated and extended cognition is dominated by 
examples of  cognitive scaffolding that are benign, in changing the cognitive demands of  a task 
in ways that favour the agent performing the task, we should not assume that this is generally 
true. We’ve argued that scaffolding can also be hostile, in serving the interests of  another agent. 
The notion of  deep hostile scaffolding potentially fills a gap in extended phenotype thinking 
about the possible routes to behaviour manipulation, and - when freed from the gene-centric 
account of  interests - suggests routes to manipulation and exploitation that go far beyond 
populating the environment with misleading superficial cues. Finally, we’ve provided extended 
examples from casinos and some types of  electronic gambling machines to argues that there 
are genuine examples of  deep hostile scaffolding. If  we’re right, further work is called for, 
including work estimating how much hostile scaffolding there is, who is gaining and losing, 
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